Former Director‑General of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) Ahmed Rufai addressed the Global Security Forum in Qatar, stating that Nigeria’s kidnapping crisis persists because of an intricate network linking terrorist outfits, criminal bandit militias, informants and money‑laundering channels.
What groups are behind the abductions?
Rufai identified three broad categories of perpetrators: terrorist organisations, bandit militias and other criminal gangs. He explained that the extremist group Boko Haram originally used kidnappings to raise funds and recruit youths, while bandit groups primarily target individuals and communities for ransom, describing it as “a kind of economy hostage‑taking.”
How have motives evolved?
According to Rufai, the reasons for kidnappings have broadened from simple fundraising to include political propaganda and prisoner exchanges. He noted that terrorist factions sometimes cooperate with criminal militias to conduct large‑scale abductions, using the operations both to generate money and to signal continued activity when security forces intensify pressure.
What evidence shows collaboration?
Rufai cited the Abuja‑Kaduna train attack, where roughly 100 passengers were seized, as a clear example of joint terrorist‑criminal action. He estimated that ransom payments of between $1 million and $2 million were collected and funneled to the extremist group Ansaru operating in the Sahel.
Has the pattern changed?
The former intelligence chief observed that kidnappings now also target schoolchildren and worshippers of both faiths, with some incidents aimed at securing the release of detained group members. He warned that negotiations become problematic when the demanded prisoners have already been killed during security operations.
Who supports the kidnapping economy?
Beyond the direct perpetrators, Rufai highlighted a supporting network of informants and financial facilitators. Informants supply details on potential victims, while financial channels—including cryptocurrencies and small‑scale money‑transfer outfits—are used to launder ransom proceeds. “They use a lot of informants that tell them about their targets, their potential targets,” he said.
What responses does he propose?
Rufai argued that strategies must be tailored to the kidnappers’ motives and identities. For groups abducting primarily for money, he recommended discreet, back‑channel negotiations through trusted intermediaries. In contrast, abductions driven by political or ideological goals demand a different, likely more forceful, approach.
He recalled the 2014 Chibok schoolgirls’ abduction, noting that intelligence and liaison channels helped maintain contact with some victims and facilitated their staged release. He recounted a rescued woman who had lived with Boko Haram for years, married three of its fighters and, after being freed, expressed a desire to see her parents while also wanting to return to the group—illustrating the complex psychological and social dynamics faced by captives.
Rufai concluded that no single tactic can resolve all hostage situations. While some bandit groups are motivated solely by profit, others are linked to broader criminal enterprises that also engage in arms trafficking and cattle rustling, further entrenching the kidnapping economy.