Analyzing Tinubu's Strategists' Blueprint for the 2027 Nigerian Elections

There is a discernible, almost artful, method in the way Bola Ahmed Tinubu, his strategists, and the All Progressives Congress (APC) appear to be positioning themselves for the 2027 General Elections. This approach is not about fostering democratic growth but rather about achieving victory through strategic elimination of opponents, akin to a chess game where pieces are removed until the board is effectively cleared.

Tinubu's 2023 electoral success was less an overwhelming mandate and more a calculated navigation of a divided political landscape. Securing 36.6 percent of the vote, his victory was a technical one, facilitated by a fractured opposition. The vote share was split among Atiku Abubakar, Peter Obi, and Rabiu Kwankwaso, leaving just enough support for the APC candidate to win. This outcome can be characterized as a victory by fractional margins, marking the lowest vote percentage in recent presidential elections.

Even prior to the election, the political maneuvering was evident. Muhammadu Buhari remained conspicuously silent during the party primaries, while Yemi Osinbajo entered the race unexpectedly, despite pressure to withdraw. The post-inauguration announcement, "Fuel subsidy is gone," while perhaps economically justifiable, proved politically challenging. It ensured that any post-election goodwill would be short-lived. If a return policy existed for democratic choices, many voters might have considered it. Many who voted for Tinubu in 2023 may now be experiencing buyer's remorse, questioning their past decisions due to the current economic hardship, escalating security concerns, perceived disregard for due process, and apparent disrespect for the separation of powers. These were not the outcomes his supporters anticipated.

Consequently, as the APC gears up for the 2027 general elections, President Tinubu's strategists are likely engaged in intensive planning. Drawing from historical precedents, they seem intent on refining their strategy to secure a second term. Applying Kenichi Ohmae's "Strategic Triangle" concept from his book, The Mind of the Strategist—which involves Company (political party), Customer (voters), and Competitor (opposition parties)—success in politics hinges on aligning party strengths with voter needs more effectively than rivals. This principle, though straightforward, appears to have been sidelined.

Instead of focusing on strengthening voter alignment, Tinubu's strategists appear to favour a more direct route: neutralizing the competition. The objective seems to be to limit the opposition's options, thereby guiding voters toward the ruling party. Attempts to form new parties face significant hurdles, joining the PDP involves navigating internal party complexities, and exploring alternatives like the ADC presents similar obstacles.

The systematic weakening of opposition parties, particularly the PDP, through defections, incentives, and pressure has resulted in a political environment that is overwhelmingly dominated by the APC. The party now controls 31 out of 36 state governorships and a growing majority in the legislature, making the opposition seem like a relic of the past. This trend might lead to a rebranding of the political system from "multi-party democracy" to "APC and its affiliates." This situation prompts a critical question: Should Nigeria consider implementing political "antitrust" measures to foster genuine competition and prevent monopolistic practices, such as induced defections and collusion?

The paradox lies in the fact that democracy is not fortified by the absence of opposition; rather, it is stifled. A system lacking credible alternatives does not foster stability but breeds apathy, resentment, and potentially unpredictable backlash. As Napoleon Bonaparte famously advised, "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake." It appears the opposition is heeding this advice, remaining largely silent while the ruling party over- optimizes its dominance.

If neutralizing competitors is the primary strategy, the secondary approach involves intricate coalition-building by segmenting the electorate into manageable groups and assembling a winning coalition. With signs of discontent from the northern base, the strategy involves shifting focus to the Middle Belt, emphasizing religious balance, cultivating new voter blocs, and reconfiguring alliances. This resembles politics managed like a spreadsheet. However, voters are not mere data points; they possess memory, emotions, and growing frustration. While fragmentation might secure election victories, it rarely builds legitimacy. Sun Tzu's counsel from The Art of War is relevant here: "When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard." By diminishing all viable alternatives, the APC risks cultivating desperation rather than submission. As history has shown, desperation can be a potent and dangerous political force.

Perhaps the most subtle and concerning aspect of this strategy is the perceived bias in institutional operations. Controversial moves by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), such as the initial proposal and subsequent reversal of voter card revalidation, send an unsettling message of uncertainty or potential bias. Furthermore, selective interpretations of court rulings impacting opposition leadership have also drawn scrutiny. These actions are not necessarily illegal, but their apparent convenience raises concerns. In established democracies, institutions serve as impartial referees. In fragile systems, however, they risk becoming participants. For instance, a recent court ruling mandating a return to the status quo ante bellum, as clarified by Femi Falana to mean reverting parties to their pre- dispute condition, was interpreted by INEC in a manner that seemed to place it within the political fray. When referees become players, the integrity of the game is compromised.

President Tinubu might be winning the immediate electoral battles, but potentially losing the larger war. The central irony is that this strategy could indeed prove successful. By dismantling the opposition, fragmenting voters, and consolidating power, victory in 2027 becomes highly probable. However, this comes at a significant cost. A democracy where the opposition is merely symbolic, voters feel cornered rather than persuaded, and institutions are viewed with suspicion, is inherently unstable. It represents a delayed crisis. Nigeria has witnessed similar scenarios before. In 1996, the late Chief Bola Ige famously described the five political parties endorsing Sani Abacha as "the five fingers of a leprous hand." Today, one might argue that a comparable pattern is emerging. Thirty years later, Tinubu's strategists seem to be replicating Abacha's playbook, potentially disregarding the ignoble consequences.

In politics, specific actions yield predictable outcomes and can have profound long-term effects. Buhari's reluctance to designate a successor and Osinbajo's participation in the 2023 primaries might ultimately enhance their democratic legacies. Tinubu, a figure deeply involved in Nigeria's pro-democracy movement, has a distinct opportunity to shape his own legacy. He could aspire not just to win elections but to bolster democratic culture. Yet, the current trajectory suggests a different ambition: to achieve such overwhelming victory that the concept of defeat becomes obsolete. This appears to be the prevailing mindset among Tinubu's strategists. However, history is seldom kind to such aspirations. In politics, as in life, when all adversaries are removed, the system itself becomes the ultimate challenger.

El-Yakubu, a Professor of Chemical Engineering at Ahmadu Bello University, contributed this analysis. [email protected]