Contemplating a Potentially Uncontested Presidential Election in Nigeria 2027

As Africa neared the dawn of the new millennium, its leadership was in the midst of deliberating the critical importance of democracy, good governance, human rights, and adherence to the rule of law as essential for the continent's security, stability, and development.

This understanding inherently pointed towards the necessity of conducting elections. Fast forward twenty years, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights would go on to assert that legitimate political authority in Africa arises solely from the regular practice of free and transparent elections through universal suffrage.

During the same period, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) leaders were tasked with interpreting what constituted “free and transparent elections.” Senior ambassadors from the OAU decided to recommend outlawing actions that manipulate constitutions to block democratic power transitions or any form of electoral fraud identified by independent and credible entities.

Rewinding to 1989, the OAU first engaged in observing the referendum for Namibia's independence, which marked its initial involvement in monitoring elections on the continent. Since the OAU's establishment in 1963, it had largely remained uninvolved in scrutinizing how governments were formed. Throughout its first decade of election observation, it never encountered an election it deemed objectionable.

This regime was comforting for leaders across Africa. In Nigeria, for example, the late General Sani Abacha, who held power from November 1993, was open to the idea of an election, provided it did not mislead anyone into thinking that there would be genuine competition.

By June 1998, General Abacha was on the verge of transitioning Nigeria to an elected governance system, with an electoral process he would oversee featuring five acknowledged political parties: the Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), the United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), the National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN), the Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM), and the Congress for National Consensus (CNC). Notably, all five parties had a single presidential candidate, General Sani Abacha.

However, Abacha's demise in June 1998 stymied that electoral blueprint and led to a reevaluation of electoral management practices that had not been sufficiently examined before in Nigeria.

By the time the All Progressives Congress (APC) came to power in 2015, the African Union (AU), which succeeded the OAU, reported that it had conducted approximately 500 election observer missions across the continent. Yet, none of these missions disapproved any election.

The AU had also developed fundamental principles for conducting elections, reflected in a continental charter on democracy that demands the existence of independent electoral management bodies, such as Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and the upholding of political pluralism and tolerance, stressing that elections should not exclude competitive candidates.

When deploying observer missions for elections, the AU insists on an independent judiciary to address disputes that arise, a process typically handled through election litigations occurring before or after polling day. In Nigeria, this delineation has historically been significant, with regular courts overseeing pre-election issues, while only election petition tribunals can address post-election outcomes.

Until 2007, these distinctions maintained clarity. However, the events following the 2007 elections saw the Supreme Court intervene in what was a pre-election dispute, manipulating the elections in Rivers State in favor of Rotimi Amaechi, who had not been on the ballot due to political machinations. This marked a pivotal moment where the judiciary began to gain undue influence over the electoral process, effectively conceding citizens' electoral rights to judges.

By 2019, this trend continued, as the Supreme Court awarded the governorship election in Zamfara State to a less-favored candidate after disqualifying the actual winner through pre-election disputes, thus barring his party from contestation.

In recent times, under the guise of legality, various African leaders have utilized the judiciary to create elections that lack genuine competition. A recent example involves Côte d’Ivoire's President Alassane Ouattara, who through legal maneuvering, eliminated all challengers ahead of presidential elections, leading to an official vote tally of about 90% in his favor.

Recently, retired Court of Appeal President, Isa Ayo Salami, proposed the idea of such uncontested elections for Nigeria, while simultaneously criticizing his judicial peers for allowing Peter Obi’s candidacy in 2023.

It is pertinent to recall that in 2011, a committee of the National Judicial Council, headed by former Court of Appeal President Umaru Abdullahi, scrutinized conducts linked to Isa Ayo Salami during the Sokoto State governorship election of 2007. Allegations, including clandestine communications with party operatives prior to judicial rulings, were examined but the committee ultimately opted not to make a definitive finding.

Isa Ayo Salami’s recent projections indicate the potential for a re-creation of Abacha-style elections in Nigeria, masked under legal pretexts. The 2026 Electoral Act includes provisions that make such actions feasible. For instance, the Act demands all parties maintain a digital membership register that details names, dates of birth, addresses, and photographs, alongside stringent deadlines to submit these registers to INEC.

This requirement raises logistical challenges and potential bureaucratic limitations, particularly for those parties unaccustomed to such digital recordkeeping. Moreover, failure to comply may result in disqualification of candidates from the electoral race.

Historically, in 1979, the Federal Electoral Commission attempted to bar Nnamdi Azikiwe of the Nigeria Peoples Party and Aminu Kano of the Peoples' Redemption Party from participating in presidential elections, but judicial intervention ultimately safeguarded their candidacies.

However, Nigeria's judicial landscape has transformed since then, with considerable space for pre-election legal manipulation within the parameters of the 2026 Electoral Act. This raises concern that methods to obstruct competitive candidates from the January 2027 presidential election could very well be exercised. Ironically, the incumbent president, who gained prominence by denouncing military rule, might paradoxically adopt strategies reminiscent of past authoritarian leaders to secure a similarly uncontested electoral process.