In January, Nigeria formally classified Lakurawa as a terrorist organization. This group, which emerged following deadly assaults in the country's northwestern areas, began gaining public attention in 2024. Between November 2024 and September 2025, it was reported that almost 100 individuals, predominantly community members, lost their lives due to its violent activities.
The United States targeted Lakurawa during airstrikes on Christmas Day in 2025. Although the details of the outcomes remain unclear, insiders associated with the organization claim that around 136 militants perished, with numerous others sustaining injuries and approximately 200 reported missing.
However, it's clear that relying solely on random airstrikes is inadequate. A strategy aimed at degrading Lakurawa requires a sustained campaign that marries aerial assaults with ground forces capable of occupying and holding territory. It is crucial to prevent Lakurawa fighters from regrouping and finding refuge along Nigeria's borders with Niger and Benin. There is a pressing need for collaborative local prevention and suppression initiatives among all nations impacted by this threat.
Lakurawa represents more than just a jihadi entity; it operates as a hybrid organization that merges ideological extremism with organized crime.
This distinction clarifies its rapid growth and the diverse recruitment across Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Chad, and Burkina Faso. Containing its influence presents a significant challenge to counter-insurgency efforts.
Reports from local villagers first noted the presence of Lakurawa in north Sokoto State, adjacent to the Niger border, in 2018.
Initially, Lakurawa positioned itself as a protector, obtaining invitations from community leaders to combat banditry, only to subsequently adopt an insurgent stance.
Research from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) indicates that Lakurawa was formed through the merger of two armed networks. Among its ranks are former members of the Salafist jihadist group, the Macina Liberation Front, and a faction from Niger with a history of defending pastoral community interests.
Lakurawa’s radical roots account for its early arsenals and capabilities in combating bandits, alongside its religious outreach efforts and extreme ideologies.
The group's activities extend across the tri-border region of Nigeria, Niger, and Benin, where a lack of state presence and security insufficiencies have allowed it to entrench itself. Its success in repelling bandit incursions has surprisingly garnered it legitimacy among local populations, now seeking its protection. This has created a concerning trend of normalizing the provision of security services by non-state entities.
From its original base in Sokoto and Kebbi states, Lakurawa has expanded southeastward into Niger State's Borgu region, bordering northern Benin.
The absence of a strong state presence in this territory has empowered Lakurawa to develop parallel governance systems, appoint local imams, levy taxes, and impose extreme religious mandates on the community. Reports received by the ISS from various informants indicate that the group’s operational leadership has shifted to Borgu.
Beyond Nigeria's borders, Lakurawa has established itself within the central Sahelian countries of Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, operating under a chief known as Amir Tajudeen, who reportedly travels among these nations.
This situation highlights the multinational nature of the group and its capacity to leverage inadequately governed border regions.
Lakurawa exploits local economies by framing its actions within a religious context, enforcing strict social norms that punish youth for shaving or listening to music, while mandating a rigid dress code. It extorts payments from farmers and herders under the guise of zakat (mandatory alms). The group uses extremist ideologies to justify its authoritarian control and violent suppression of dissent.
The recruitment model of Lakurawa capitalizes on socioeconomic and security weaknesses. The group offers financial assistance, agricultural supplies (including fertilizers and seeds), and water pumps in exchange for loyalty, instilling a culture of fear among communities that might otherwise report their activities.
With an estimated membership of around 2,000, Lakurawa continues to grow rapidly. Its hybrid nature indicates potential collaborations with other criminal organizations and possibly factions of Boko Haram. For instance, in 2024, Lakurawa reached out to the notorious bandit leader Bello Turji from Zamfara State in northwestern Nigeria, urging him to cease his criminal pursuits — indicating a strategy of collaboration rather than conflict.
After a phase of limited state intervention, Nigerian military efforts against Lakurawa ramped up substantially from late 2025, particularly in the Kebbi and Niger states.
Security sources have drawn links to an ongoing reassessment of the threat posed by Lakurawa, particularly as its activities have rapidly spread across several states, with numerous high-profile kidnappings taking place.
One significant incident included the abduction of Papiri school-age children, which brought Lakurawa under closer intelligence scrutiny, a situation reminiscent of Boko Haram's infamous kidnapping of the Chibok girls.
Recent findings from the ISS suggest that Lakurawa maintains operational ties to Boko Haram, specifically with the Jamatu Ahli Al-Sunna lil Da’wa Wal Jihad (JAS) faction, as well as with non-ideological bandits involved in the Papiri kidnapping.
Financing strategies reveal a convergence between jihadist insurgency and organized criminal enterprises. Similar to other groups like JAS and known bandit networks, Lakurawa has increasingly engaged in kidnappings for ransom as a vital revenue source.
This marks a notable shift from their initial modus operandi, which focused primarily on extorting farmers and herders via zakat.
Following US airstrikes targeting Lakurawa’s bases in the Bauni Forest area of Sokoto State, insiders indicate that the group anticipates reinforcements from the Sahel. Local reports suggest that ongoing violence and extortion are prevalent.
For effective eradication of Lakurawa, counter-terrorism and prevention strategies must be localized to tackle the deep-seated socio-economic, political, and governance divides that allow such factions to garner community support and prosper.
Regional security cooperation will need enhancement through the re- establishment and institutionalizing of intelligence-sharing networks alongside joint operations between Nigeria and Niger, and also with Benin. Tensions with Niger following its coup in 2023 complicate security collaborations and hinder vital joint tasks. Addressing these tensions is critical for successfully neutralizing Lakurawa.
Focused military campaigns aimed at dismantling Lakurawa’s network, leadership, and logistical operations should coincide with initiatives that allow lower-ranking members an opportunity to safely surrender and engage in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs.
Finally, it is essential that the communities lead these responses. Empowering traditional leaders, religious figures, and youth is vital in promoting tolerance, facilitating safe information-sharing, countering extremist narratives, and restoring faith in state protections.
Célestin Delanga, Research Officer, Taiwo Adebayo, Researcher, and Remadji Hoinathy, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS).
Read the complete ISS report: "Lakurawa – a hybrid jihadi-criminal group on Nigeria’s fragile borderlands" here.
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